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• Expanding social protection coverage of migrants is integral to achieving the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, specifically Goals 1 and 10.
•  Yet coverage for labour migrants remains low. 22% of migrants are not covered, including less 
than 1% migrants moving between low-income countries.
•  Globally, 55% of migrants are entitled to access social protection benefits, but cannot take these 
benefits home, or to another country (the ‘portability’ of benefits).
•  States should therefore ensure labour migrants are eligible for, and participate in, social protection, 
and that they can transfer benefits they have contributed towards.
• To be able to create, implement and enforce effective social protection for migrants, national 
bodies need better data and more support.
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1 Introduction1 
This briefing considers the extent to which international 
labour migrants2 are covered by social protection, and the 
implications this has for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (2030 Agenda). More specifically, this brief 
shows that social protection coverage of international 
labour migrants varies considerably, and outlines how 
this has a bearing on the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) related to social protection.
Social protection is the set of policies and programmes 
that aim to reduce poverty and vulnerability and to 
enhance the capacity of people to manage economic and 
social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, disability 
and old age. It includes social assistance programmes, 
which are not conditional on having previously made 
contributions (e.g. cash transfers to poor households) – and 
social insurance programmes3, which are conditional on 
past contributions (e.g. contributory old-age pensions). 
There is a large evidence base showing the positive impact 
social protection programmes can have on reducing 
poverty and child labour, and on improving health and 
education outcomes and investment in productive assets 
(e.g. agricultural tools) (Babajanian et al., 2014; Bastagli 
et al., 2016; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2011). As such, social 
protection is seen as a priority area for achieving the 2030 
Agenda, specifically in its contribution to Goal 1 (No 
Poverty) and Goal 10 (Reduced Inequalities), and their 
Targets4.
Several international agreements governing social 
protection systems already make reference to the eligibility 
1. Many thanks to Pietro Mona (SDC), Clara van Panhuys (ILO), Francesca Bastagli and Helen Dempster (ODI) who provided comments on an earlier 
draft. Many thanks to Evelyn Smail for managing the project, and Sean Willmott for designing the infographics.
2. This briefing will focus on international labour migrants (or ‘migrant workers’), defined as individuals who moved from one country to another for 
the purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011). Where the briefing refers to other types of migrants, for example 
internal migrants, this will be stated explicitly.
3. These types of programmes are also sometimes called ‘social security’.
4. SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage is also often considered a priority target for social protection, but this goal is dealt with in a separate briefing paper 
on health, migration and the 2030 Agenda (Tulloch at al., 2016). This briefing also does not cover the decent work aspects of social protection (SDG 5.4, 
SDG 8.5 and SDG 8.B).
5. There is a distinction between de jure, or legal, coverage of migrants, meaning official social protection coverage of migrants under relevant agreements 
and mechanisms, and de facto, or effective, coverage, which may differ to this due to issues in ratification or implementation of these agreements, or 
practical access and take-up issues. As there is limited data on effective coverage, this briefing will mainly focus on legal coverage.
of migrants. The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) has long championed universal eligibility to social 
protection. Their 1952 Convention No. 102, which 
required equality of social protection treatment, has been 
ratified by 55 countries (ILO, 2017). More recently, they 
passed Recommendation No. 202, known as the Social 
Protection Floor. This sets out four basic social protection 
guarantees to all residents and children. Furthermore, 
several blocks of countries have agreed to guarantee social 
protection access to migrants moving within them, the 
best-known example being Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 for 
European Union (EU) migrant workers. Globally, there 
are also hundreds of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
between specific countries. The Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda of 2015, for example, commits UN member 
countries to improving ‘access to and portability of earned 
benefits [social insurance]’ (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), 2015).
In spite of these agreements, both the legal and effective 
social protection coverage of international labour migrants 
remains low5. Section 2 of this briefing discusses existing 
agreements and their legal coverage. Section 3 explores 
the factors that lead to low legal coverage for migrants 
and exclusion from effective coverage. Section 4 links the 
analysis to the 2030 Agenda, showing why these issues 
need to be considered for governments to meet the SDGs, 
in particular Targets 1.3, 1.a and 10.4. Finally, Section 5 
concludes and offers recommendations to improve legal 
and effective social protection coverage of migrants.
2 ODI Briefing
Migration and the Sustainable Development Goals: a briefing series 
People migrate to overcome poverty, escape conflict, or cope with economic and environmental shocks. In the 
words of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, migration is ‘an expression of the human aspiration for 
dignity, safety and a better future. It is part of the social fabric, part of our very make-up as a human family’. 
Migration is one of the defining features of the 21st century and can contribute to achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). For this to happen, we need a better understanding of the relationships between 
migration and key development issues – such as health, education, gender, labour and urbanisation. This series of 
briefs, commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), explores these relationships 
across the 2030 Agenda and the impact of migration on key development outcomes. 
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2 Legal coverage varies considerably, 
but tends to be low
Social protection programmes differ in two main respects: 
the extent to which migrants can access them in their host 
country, and whether their benefits can be withdrawn in 
another country, in other words whether they are portable 
(see Figure 1). Social assistance programmes are often 
funded through general national taxation (for example, 
maternity allowances) or through external funding such as 
official development assistance (ODA). These programmes 
are usually not portable (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2011).
Labour migrants should have legal access to a host 
country’s social protection system if there is:
1. A bilateral or multilateral agreement enabling eligibility 
for, and portability of, social protection between 
countries.
2. Unilateral programmes, provisions of equality of 
treatment or access to voluntary insurance in their host 
country.
3. More rarely, labour migrants may be covered by 
unilateral programmes from their origin country, such as 
a fund for overseas workers. 
2.1 Frameworks for labour migrants’ access to 
social protection
This section describes the nature of migrants’ legal access 
to social protection, firstly considering entitlement while 
residing in a country and, secondly, considering portability 
of accumulated entitlements upon moving country.
A bilateral portability agreement between two countries 
sets out social protection entitlements to a citizen of 
one country who is resident in the other. Most bilateral 
Figure 1: The portability of social protection benefits
Some benefits are ‘not portable’ meaning that 
migrants are not allowed to withdraw the benefit 
while residing in another country.
If a migrant can withdraw their social protection 
benefits while residing in another country, the 
benefits are considered ‘portable’. 
agreements are between high-income countries (such 
as those concluded between the United States and 27 
high- and upper-middle-income countries6). Bilateral 
agreements covering South-North migrants are sometimes 
designed around temporary labour migration, such as 
Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) 
(Holzmann and Pouget, 2010). Certain EU countries have 
agreements with Turkey and Morocco allowing labour 
migrants’ contributions into national social insurance 
schemes to accumulate across countries (Holzmann, 
2010). Bilateral agreements also exist between low-income 
countries, although these are more rare and less extensive 
in legal coverage. One example is that between Malawi 
and Zambia, which provides healthcare for temporary 
mine workers from Malawi through the Zambian Workers 
Compensation Fund (Avato et al., 2009).
Multilateral agreements provide a framework for 
coordinating portability at the regional level. For instance, 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) allows social 
security contributions to accumulate across member states, 
helping labour migrants to meet state-pension contribution 
thresholds (Taha et al., 2015, van Ginneken et al., 2013). 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has a regional legal 
framework for pension portability and other entitlements 
for all migrants from member states (van Ginneken, 2013). 
The Ibero-American multilateral agreement between Spain, 
Portugal and 20 Latin American countries provides a 
pension floor for labour migrants (Taha et al., 2015). The 
East African Community (EAC) gives its nationals and all 
migrants from member states equal rights to national social 
security systems; however, its member states have mostly 
under-developed systems to begin with and migrants lose 
their accumulated contributions upon returning to their 
country of origin (ibid).
Social protection can be made accessible to migrants 
through unilateral measures of destination countries. For 
example, third-country nationals legally resident in the EU 
for five years become entitled to equal treatment with EU 
nationals7. Canada, Australia and New Zealand also have 
generous entitlements for permanent resident migrants 
(and temporary migrants in New Zealand). Such measures 
are much more rare in low-income countries. For example, 
labour migrants arriving in member states of the GCC or 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
are not granted any right to access social protection. 
One exception is Barbados, where labour migrants can 
participate in the national social security system even if 
they lack a work permit (Taha et al., 2015; Morlachetti, 
2015). Host countries’ laws can also permit portability, 
for instance Australia and Malaysia refund contributions 
accrued as a lump sum when a migrant departs the 
country.
6. https://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html
7. EU Directive 109/2003.
Migrants from the global South may be covered by a 
unilateral programme from their origin country. A notable 
example is the Philippines Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration (OWWA) (see Box 1). Sri Lanka has a 
similar voluntary, contributions-based fund for overseas 
workers, with the benefits paid out to family members 
left in Sri Lanka (Taha et al., 2015), while Mexico has 
a voluntary national social insurance programme for 
emigrants to the US (ibid.). 
Finally, irregular labour migrants and those working in 
the informal economy tend not to be covered by national 
social protection systems. Asylum seekers and refugees 
outside high-income countries are also rarely covered, but 
instead may receive humanitarian support offering short-
term or ad-hoc protection (e.g. Hagen-Zanker et al., 2017).
2.2 Data showing migrants’ legal social 
protection coverage
While specific data is not available for most countries, 
Avato et al. (2009) have compiled a database of migrant 
stocks by destination and origin country, and paired 
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Box 1: Migrant welfare funds
Some countries of origin such as Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand 
use migrant welfare funds to protect their labour 
migrants abroad. These funds are contributory 
schemes funded usually by employers, recruitment 
agencies and/or migrants, which provide a range of 
services to migrants while overseas. They commonly 
include life and medical insurance, loans and 
repatriation services (Ruiz and Agunias, 2008). They 
also provide government with funds to finance other 
migrant programmes such as pre-departure rights 
education, and can support migrants’ families at 
home (Jones, 2015).
The OWWA is the most developed of these 
funds. Managed by a government agency within 
the Department of Labor and Employment, 
OWWA is funded by a mandatory membership 
fee of US$25 paid prior to migration, either by 
the employer, recruitment agency or migrant. The 
fund pools these contributions to offer services to 
migrants including life and accident insurance, legal 
assistance and on-site help at embassies (Ruiz and 
Agunias, 2007). As of 2013, OWWA membership 
was over 1.6 million and had raised over US$300 
million (OWWA, 2013). These funds allow origin 
governments to support migrants abroad; as such 
they offer a potential solution to financing migrant 
social protection.
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this information with whether a bilateral or multilateral 
portability agreement covers each migration corridor8. 
Most agreements concern the benefits of contributory 
systems such as disability, survivors’ and old-age pensions. 
They also estimate the number of migrants who are not 
covered by portability agreements but are entitled to 
social protection access in their host country through a 
unilateral programme. This category could include access 
to non-contributory social assistance. When it comes to 
those who are not covered, official data sources only tend 
to capture those with regular status, while the stocks of 
undocumented migrants must be estimated9.
Migrants therefore fall into three categories:
8. Based on data from 2000/2001.
9. Undocumented migrants are typically excluded from social protection provision by law and are unlikely to take up any that they are entitled to for fear 
of exposure and the harassment or legal consequences that might ensue (Taha et al., 2015). The figures quoted here include estimates of undocumented 
migrants included in the data compiled by Avato et al. (2009).
 • those that move between countries and are covered by a 
bilateral or multilateral agreement (23%)
 • those that move between countries without an 
agreement but are still entitled to some social protection 
(55%)
 • those that have no access to social protection (22%).
Firstly, around a quarter of all migrants move between 
countries with a bilateral or multilateral agreement in 
place, meaning that in principle some migrants are entitled 
to social protection and portability of benefits (Avato et 
al., 2009). However, as Figure 2 shows, while 90% of 
high-income to high-income movers fall into this category, 
 
Figure 2: Most migrants moving between high-income countries are legally covered by social protection, whereas 
coverage of migrants moving between low-income countries is low
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on data compiled by Avato et al. (2009) and hosted by the World Bank http://go.worldbank.org/
NCO9EJABP0. The figure shows the percentage of migrants (size of ‘bubble’) who are legally covered by a bilateral or multilateral social 
protection portability agreement, split by the income classification of their origin and destination country.
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less than 1% of migrants moving between low-income 
countries are legally covered. Overall, around 17% of 
those migrating from low- or middle-income countries 
to high-income countries are covered by a bilateral or 
multilateral social protection agreement. Some countries 
have secured bilateral agreements that result in higher 
coverage of their emigrants, notably Morocco (89% of 
emigrants), Algeria (87%) and Turkey (65%); however this 
is only for documented migrants, as we explore further in 
the next section. This is compared to a coverage rate of 
0.5% among Mexico’s 1.1 million emigrants, who migrate 
largely to the United States. 
Secondly, in the absence of formal agreements, migrants 
may still be entitled to some form of social protection in 
their host country, although these benefits are unlikely to 
be portable. In fact, most migrants fall into this category 
(55% globally). While this situation is better than having 
no access at all, it is still precarious. Some within this 
category migrate to high-income countries where they are 
generally entitled to a full range of social protection, even 
if the benefits are not portable. The majority within this 
category, however, are migrating between low- and lower-
middle-income countries where national social protection 
systems are generally weak.10
Finally, the most vulnerable group are arguably the 
remaining 22% of migrants who are neither legally covered 
by a bilateral/multilateral agreement nor entitled to social 
protection by host-country law. As Holzmann et al. (2015) 
have noted, these migrants may have access to some 
short-term provisions but are denied long-term or equal 
access as citizens. Almost all these migrants originate in 
the global South and the majority move to another low- or 
middle-income country. However, a large share (around 
42%) of those moving with no access to social protection 
are moving to high-income countries and this category 
includes large numbers of undocumented migrants. 
3 Why are migrants not covered by 
social protection? 
A range of factors affect legal and effective social 
protection coverage of labour migrants including non-
eligibility, barriers to take-up and portability constraints. 
Further, these factors often interact with others including 
10. A more recent study by van Panhuys et al. (2017) found considerable regional variation in whether countries had laws in place granting equality of 
treatment to non-nationals for contributory social security and healthcare. It finds that Latin America had the highest proportion of countries granting 
equal legal treatment to non-nationals, although this may not reflect effective coverage.
11. A recent ILO study shows that of 120 countries, more than 70 have made provisions in the law granting equality of treatment between national and non-
nationals with regards to contributory social security (Van Panhuys et al., 2017).
12. Countries make distinctions, for example, between the rights of migrants with permanent, temporary or irregular residence status. Further distinctions 
and restrictions of rights based on the migrant‘s specific citizenship and purpose of residence (e.g. work vs. family reunion) are common (Ruhs, 2009).
13. To be eligible, workers must show their employer paid employment insurance either for 600 insurable hours in the past 52 weeks or since their last claim, 
whichever is less. This excludes many seasonal workers, as they only work for part of the year (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010).
14. One common exception to this is emergency healthcare; in many European countries hospitals are obliged to treat individuals for free even if they are 
undocumented. Some countries, such as Bulgaria, provide social benefits to irregular migrants as for natives (though this tends to be the exception rather 
than the rule), while others do not explicitly link benefits access to regularity of employment (Council of Europe, 2004).
gaps between policy design and implementation, practical 
barriers to participation, and political sensitivity. 
3.1 Eligibility
Labour migrants can be ineligible for social protection 
in two ways. First they may lose eligibility for social 
protection in their home country if they work in another 
country. Second, they can be legally ineligible for social 
protection in host countries. Although many countries 
have committed to equality of treatment between nationals 
and migrants11, this is not always followed in practice12. 
Some countries limit access by residency and/or nationality 
requirements (Hirose et al., 2011). For example, many 
countries in the Gulf only provide pensions to nationals 
and have no provisions for migrant workers (Avato et 
al., 2009). In addition, this can affect internal migrants. 
For instance, rural-urban migrants in China are ineligible 
for China’s biggest social assistance programme – the 
Minimum Living Standards Guarantee Programme – and 
must meet stringent requirements to access social insurance 
programmes (Hopkins et al., 2016).
Some eligibility requirements mean access to social 
protection is cut off for certain groups of migrant workers, 
such as the self-employed or those earning too little (Taha 
et al., 2015; ISSA, 2014). For example, while Canada’s 
SAWP gives labour migrants the same social protection 
status as other groups, in practice it is difficult for seasonal 
migrant workers to meet eligibility requirements for 
unemployment benefits13 (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010 
in Taha et al., 2015). Immigration status and formality of 
employment also affects access: for example, the European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 
excludes irregular migrants from its scope (Council of 
Europe, 2004)14. Further, informal economy employers are 
unlikely to extend social protection to their workers (van 
Ginneken, 2013). Many migrants are both undocumented 
and work in the informal economy, which can compound 
their weak legal and social position in a host country. 
Migrants can also be excluded due to political 
sensitivities. In host countries, negative public attitudes 
tend to highlight concerns about migration increasing 
job competition, placing downward pressure on wages, 
and adding pressure on public services (ISSA 2014; 
Ford and Heath, 2014; Ford and Lowles, 2016). This 
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is linked to perceptions that migrant workers ‘take 
advantage’ of a country’s welfare system, even though 
the empirical evidence shows that this is mostly not 
the case (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2013).. For example, 37% of 
European citizens support migrants receiving benefits and 
services only after they have acquired citizenship of a host 
country (Dustmann and Frattini, 2013).. This climate can 
be a constraint in extending social protection to migrant 
workers, through a lack of political commitment from the 
host government. 
3.2 Legislation implementation and enforcement
Even when there are social protection arrangements 
in place for labour migrants, the implementation and 
enforcement of these can be ineffective (van Ginneken, 
2013 in Taha et al., 2015; Box 2). There is evidence 
that some national and multilateral social protection 
instruments for migrants are not properly enforced. For 
example, implementation of relevant Indonesian legislation 
is weak due to lack of coordination between central and 
regional government. The CARICOM agreement has been 
applied infrequently, which is thought to be due to design 
inconsistencies and lack of public awareness (International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), 2010; Pasadilla and 
Abella, 2012; Fortaleza, 2010 in Holzmann and Pouget, 
2010).
Administering social protection to migrants can be 
difficult. For example, if benefits are means-tested, it 
may be necessary to obtain information on the financial 
situation of the migrant worker’s family abroad to assess 
eligibility. This can be costly or even impossible to secure 
(ISSA, 2014). Further, documentation to process claims can 
require knowledge of another country’s system (ibid.), and 
officials in countries of origins must be aware of the detail 
of agreements (Holzmann, 2016)15. 
Finally, employers of migrant workers do not always 
enforce relevant arrangements, knowingly or otherwise. 
For example, while documented Moroccan migrant 
workers can accrue portable social protection and 
retirement benefits in Spain, there is evidence that many 
of their employers do not provide migrants with relevant 
documentation for this (Arango and Martin, 2005 in Taha 
et al., 2015).
3.3 Barriers to take-up
Even if programmes are accessible and implemented 
effectively, knowledge gaps, language and financial 
barriers, time constraints and lack of representation 
can affect migrant take-up (see Box 3 for a case study). 
Furthermore, time and travel costs associated with the 
application process may prove a deterrent. For example, 
15. The ILO has formalised the exchange and provision of administrative assistance through international labour standards with respect to migrants and 
social protection, namely the Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118), Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 
1982 (No. 157) and the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167).
one study found that Mexican and Jamaican workers had 
difficulty accessing available health benefits in Canada 
due to lack of information on available services, language 
barriers, and long working hours limiting their access 
(McLaughlin, 2009 in Holzmann and Pouget, 2010). 
Social protection can also incur more direct financial 
costs such as monthly contributions or ad-hoc payments, 
which can be a barrier for many, particularly those in low-
skilled or low-wage labour (Hopkins et al., 2016). This 
affects labour migrants in the informal economy especially. 
As their work can involve low and irregular income, their 
capacity and willingness to contribute to social protection 
financing programmes can be limited, especially if they 
do not perceive these to meet their most important needs 
(Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, 2003).
Box 2: Fragmented enforcement of legislation in 
Southern Africa
Regional efforts to harmonise cross-border 
social protection, while encouraging, can have a 
limited impact due to institutional and political 
factors. The 2014 Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol on Employment and 
Labour contains provisions on the coordination of 
social security schemes and portability of benefits, 
however it has not yet been ratified by member 
states. The effects of an earlier non-binding Code 
on Social Security are also limited and social 
protection systems across SADC remain highly 
fragmented and tend to exclude migrants (Olivier, 
2009; Millard, 2008). The SADC’s institutional 
weakness and limited resources, as well as the 
absence of an accompanying policy framework on 
regional movement of labour, limit its enforcement 
capability (Dodson and Crush, 2015; Olivier, 2009). 
Therefore, migrant social protection continues to be 
decided at the national level in SADC, which can be 
problematic (Dodson and Crush, 2015). 
For example, South Africa, a primary destination 
for SADC migrants, largely excludes migrant 
workers from its national social protection system 
(Fish, 2013; Millard, 2008; Mpedi and Nyenti 
2013). Its bilateral agreements with other SADC 
states do not usually include social protection and 
where they do, for example with Mozambique, 
relevant mechanisms can be poorly enforced 
and employers’ compliance low (Mpedi and 
Nyenti, 2013; Olivier, 2009). This has been linked 
to negative anti-immigrant attitudes; 90% of 
respondents in a 2010 national survey felt there 
were too many foreigners in South Africa (Crush et 
al., 2013 in Dodson and Crush, 2015). 
3.4 Portability constraints
As highlighted above, the benefits received from social 
protection systems can be portable, not portable, or 
lie somewhere in between. For instance, some of the 
world’s largest migrant-sending and -receiving countries 
– Bangladesh, China, Mexico, Russia – have almost no 
arrangements in place for social protection portability (van 
Panhuys et al, 2017). Some countries limit the portability 
of pensions by applying different rates to people from 
different countries, or by banning pension payments to 
selected countries. For example, Germany and the UK 
apply reduction rates to pension payments for nationals 
of countries with which they have no social security 
agreement, and the US bans pension payment to selected 
countries (Holzmann et al., 2005). The most common 
issues are summarised in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The most common portability constraints
Portability constraints
Where a migrant worker is legally able to contribute to their host country’s social 
insurance system, such entitlements are not always portable or transferrable. 
The most common issues are:
Totalisation 
Migrants who contribute to systems in different 
countries in different years may not have these 
contributions added together. They may therefore 
not be entitled to a full pension.
Limited Exportability 
Some countries limit the portability of pensions: 
by applying different rates to people from different 
countries, or by banning pension payments to 
selected countries. 
Transfer cost 
Entitlements are usually paid through international 
money transfers, which are subject to fees and 
exchange rate fluctuations. These costs can be high 
in countries with less developed financial systems.
Partial Portability 
Some benefits aren’t covered under portability 
clauses; including healthcare entitlements and many 
tax-funded benefits (such as maternity allowances). 
This particularly affects retired migrant workers.
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Box 3: Bureaucratic requirements affecting take up 
of social protection in India
Programme registration requirements can prove an 
additional barrier to take-up. Such requirements 
may unintentionally make it harder for migrants to 
participate. This is the case in India where, despite 
legal access to the Public Distribution System 
(PDS), which offers access to subsidised food to 
poor households, internal migrants can be excluded 
through complicated regulations and administrative 
requirements (MacAuslan, 2009, 2011). Eligibility 
for PDS and other Indian social protection 
programmes is linked to residency and registration 
status. For example, to access PDS, residency criteria 
mean migrants must reapply with every move across 
certain boundaries. Different forms need to be 
filled out and attested to by government officials, 
and limited knowledge of local bureaucracies and 
weaker social networks leads to reluctance amongst 
migrants to apply.
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4 Relevance to the 2030 Agenda
The 2030 Agenda advocates safe and orderly migration 
and the expansion of legal and effective social 
protection coverage, though it does not explicitly link 
the two. However, we argue that migration affects the 
implementation of the three main Targets on social 
protection (see Table 1), as well as several other Targets 
and Goals, and that these cannot be met effectively if these 
links are not considered.
Target 1.3 calls for the implementation of nationally 
appropriate social systems, measures, including floors, 
and for social protection systems to achieve ‘substantial 
coverage of poor and vulnerable groups’. Labour migrants 
are often a vulnerable sub-group, particularly those with 
irregular status or those in informal employment. In some 
circumstances, migrants are more likely to have physical 
(Tulloch et al., 2016) and mental health issues (Sabates-
Wheeler and Waites, 2007). Migrants can also face 
discrimination in access to labour markets and housing 
(Lucci et al., 2016), as well as stigma or harassment. 
Therefore migrant workers may have a particularly salient 
need for social protection. Those working in dangerous 
working environments have a greater risk of work-related 
accidents or ill health and hence require sickness, disability 
or work-injury benefits. Often being in irregular and badly 
paid employment can mean migrants have a strong need 
for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, working in a new 
and foreign environment, often without family support and 
with weak social networks, migrants can lack information 
as well as informal support (ISSA, 2014). Failing to include 
labour migrants in conceptualising and implementing 
Target 1.3 will negatively affect the Target’s outcome as it 
will exclude one specific poor and vulnerable group; this 
undermines the general principle in the 2030 Agenda of 
‘leaving no-one behind’. 
One particularly vulnerable sub-group of labour 
migrants is that of domestic workers (see this series’ gender 
briefing for a detailed discussion (O’Neil et al., 2016)). As 
this group often lacks regularised status or access to social 
insurance through their employer, it is likely to have low 
effective social protection coverage – though data on this 
is lacking. This directly impacts Target 5.4, which calls for 
the recognition of domestic work through public services, 
infrastructure and social protection policies.
Many labour migrants can lose access to social 
protection when they move to another country or back 
home. This could reduce return migration and/or decrease 
payments of social security, as the incentives to stay in the 
host country and to move into the informal economy and/
or into an irregular migration status may be higher. This 
would make it harder to monitor migration flows and 
implement evidence-based policy, negatively impacting 
Target 10.7 on ‘safe and orderly migration’. The Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda also emphasises that access to and 
16. Furthermore, expansion of social security coverage is argued to be an effective tool to reduce exploitation and abuse of workers through the formalisation 
of working practices (ISSA, 2014).
portability of earned benefits is part of ensuring safe, 
orderly and regular migration (UN DESA, 2015). 
If limited portability disincentivises return migration, 
this could deprive origin countries – many of them 
developing countries – of the beneficial development effects 
of migration. Migration can be an important contribution 
to economic development in origin countries, for instance 
through remittances, investment and knowledge exchange 
(see Clemens, 2011), so this could also impact the success 
of other SDGs, for instance Goal 8 on sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth.
Labour migrants can contribute to the achievement 
of Target 1.a, which calls for ‘significant mobilization 
of resources’ […] to implement programmes and 
policies to end poverty’, including social protection. 
Besides their direct social security contributions, labour 
migrants generate additional resources for governments 
to deliver social protection programmes, for instance 
through personal income tax and indirect taxes such as 
consumption taxes. Research has shown that migrants 
often make net fiscal contributions to host countries 
(Dustmann and Frattini, 2013), paying more in taxes 
and social insurance contributions than they take out in 
benefits. Likewise, a study by OECD (2013) showed that 
the majority of OECD countries drew a positive balance 
from migration in their social security systems. 
However, high levels of mobility by migrant workers 
can make their contributions less predictable. Significant 
labour-market informality in many low-income economies 
acts as a constraint to increases in tax revenue through 
social security contributions. Initiatives either to formalise 
such sectors or to include informal-sector workers 
(including migrants, who are heavily represented in this 
group) in contributory social protection can expand the 
tax base (Bastagli and Hagen-Zanker, 2014). The potential 
resources to be gained from this are high: the United 
States Social Security Administration, for example, has 
acknowledged that mostly non-reimbursable contributions 
by undocumented workers represented a US$12 billion 
annual net gain to the US accounts in 2010 (Goss et al., 
2013)16. 
At the same time, if migrants are eligible for and receive 
tax-funded benefits, this could lead to increased costs 
for host countries. If needed, additional resources can be 
mobilised by designing programmes that share the costs 
of delivering social protection to migrants. For example, 
social insurance programmes tend to involve contributions 
from workers, employers and the host state. A greater 
number of contributors also leads to better risk pooling 
and financial sustainability of the system. Country-of-
origin governments can be involved, for example through 
Migrant Welfare Funds, which are funded through 
contributions by employers, recruitment agencies and/or 
labour migrants (see Box 1).
Finally Target 10.4 calls for social protection to 
‘progressively achieve greater equality’. On the one 
hand, social protection has been shown to tackle income 
inequality and unequal access to basic services (UN 
ESCAP, 2015). For example, one study found that cash 
transfers alone reduced the Gini coefficient (a measure of 
inequality) in six Latin-American countries by 1%-9% 
(Lustig et al., 2013). On the other hand, as discussed in 
Section 3, social protection policies do not guarantee equal 
access, with ‘non-natives’ having lower eligibility and 
lower take-up when eligible. This implies that if vulnerable 
groups (including labour migrants) are excluded from 
social protection coverage, inequality remains the same or 
widens. 
Policy design can widen this inequality, in particular 
with regards to portability. As shown in Section 3, 
some labour migrants may acquire entitlement to social 
protection by fulfilling their host country’s national 
requirements, only to have these reduced or barred if they 
move back to their origin or another country. As a result, 
these migrants subsequently experience unequal access to 
social protection in both origin and host countries.
5 Conclusions and policy 
recommendations 
The 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of social 
protection in reducing poverty and inequalities. It sets out 
specific targets for improving coverage amongst vulnerable 
groups and for mobilising funds to implement social 
protection programmes. International labour migrants 
are a vulnerable group, yet they often lack access to social 
protection, particularly those coming from low-income 
countries, those with irregular migration status and/or 
those working in the informal economy. 
Improving social protection for labour migrants goes 
hand in hand with better management of labour migration. 
Providing legal channels to migrants and including them 
in national social protection systems expands the base 
of potential contributors. At the same time, increasing 
social protection coverage is tightly linked with bringing 
migrant workers into the formal economy (ISSA, 2014) 
and, as such, also increases the ability of states to manage 
migration. Increased formalisation of workers also leads to 
higher tax contributions and a more productive workforce 
(ibid). Finally, guaranteeing portability of benefits removes 
Relevant SDG Target Migration challenge
Goal 1: No poverty
1.3 Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures 
for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor 
and the vulnerable.
Labour migrants can be a particularly poor and vulnerable group, especially in 
terms of work and health-related risks, but often lack eligibility for legal social 
protection and/or are not effectively covered.
Where migrants are legally covered by a social protection mechanism, benefits 
are often non-portable, further reducing coverage amongst a group that is highly 
mobile.
1.a Ensure significant mobilization of resources from a variety of sources, 
including through enhanced development cooperation, in order to provide 
adequate and predictable means for developing countries, in particular least 
developed countries, to implement programmes and policies to end poverty in 
all its dimensions.
Labour migrants present an opportunity to increase the tax base, and a greater 
number of contributors to social insurance-type schemes leads to better risk 
pooling and financial sustainability. 
However, high immigration can at first lead to increased costs for host countries 
if immigrants are eligible for tax-funded benefits and take-up is high. Due to 
political sensitivities around migration, with many countries (especially low-
income countries) already having limited resources for social protection, it can 
be difficult to justify expansion of eligibility to labour migrants.
Goal 10: Reduced inequalities
10.4 Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and 
progressively achieve greater equality
Social protection policies often do not guarantee equal access to social 
protection, particularly for ‘non-natives’, which means that labour migrants 
have lower eligibility for, and, where eligible, lower take-up of social protection. 
If vulnerable groups (such as labour migrants) are unable to participate in social 
protection, inequalities widen.
The design of social protection policy can fail to account for mobility of 
beneficiaries, with portability being a key constraint for labour migrants in 
accessing benefits they have contributed towards.
Table 1: The main interrelationships between social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda
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some of the constraints to the mobility of labour so 
migration flows can be more closely matched to the supply 
and demand for labour. Effective coverage and portability 
are also important to ensure wellbeing and prevent 
vulnerability through the whole of a migrant’s life.
The recommendations below set out key actions for 
national governments, international institutions and 
civil-society organisations to improve social protection for 
international labour migrants. Ultimately, increasing their 
participation in social protection is not only important 
to protect migrants, but also plays an important role in 
maximising the potential benefits of labour migration for 
migrants, origin and host countries.
Conclusion 1: Legal and effective social protection 
coverage is important for labour migrants, but is 
very patchy outside high-income countries.
Most labour migrants moving to high-income countries 
are covered by a social protection agreement or provision 
giving some degree of access and portability. However, the 
proportion of those moving between low-income countries 
that are legally covered is less than 1%. These countries 
tend to have under-developed national social protection 
systems that also leave large shares of their native 
population uncovered. Furthermore, low legal coverage is 
especially prevalent among undocumented migrants and 
those working in the informal economy.
Recommendation: increase eligibility through new 
agreements and make it more feasible for migrants to 
participants in social protection.
 • Host countries can increase labour migrants’ eligibility 
for social protection by building on existing measures 
and by concluding new agreements. Particular attention 
must be paid to improving legal coverage of migrants 
from low- and middle-income countries. 
 • Migrants in the informal economy are often in irregular 
work and unable to make regular social protection 
contributions. These factors need to be taken into 
account when designing the scope of benefits, financing 
mechanisms and administrative procedures for informal 
workers. In addition, governments, organisations and 
employers can provide effective informal protection for 
informal workers, for example by holding preventive 
health-education workshops or empowering informal 
worker alliances in certain industries (Lund, 2009).
 • Where labour migrants are not legally or effectively 
covered through other measures, country-of-origin 
governments should consider migrant welfare funds for 
emigrants. These funds provide basic protection through 
contributions from employers, recruitment agencies and 
migrants. They can be a good bridging measure, when 
integration into social protection systems in the host 
country is not yet feasible.
Conclusion 2: Some migrants are legally covered by 
social protection in the host country, but lose these 
benefits when they move again. 
Even if a labour migrant is legally eligible to contribute 
to and receive benefits from their host country’s 
social insurance system, their entitlements may not be 
transferrable when they move back home or to another 
country. This increases the migrant’s vulnerability and 
reduces their incentives to contribute to social insurance 
systems. Some benefits that are in principle portable, such 
as pensions, carry limitations such as high transfer fees or 
not being transferable to certain countries.
Recommendation: extend and improve social 
protection portability for migrants. 
 • Continue to negotiate bilateral and multilateral social 
security agreements along key migration corridors 
and within regional groupings of states, extending 
portability practices of pensions and other benefits to 
more countries. Focus on extending these to include 
low-income countries. Timely ratification of these 
agreements between states should also be encouraged to 
ensure they are operational as soon as possible. 
 • Lift any restrictions on existing portability arrangements 
by origin countries. This includes enabling the transfer 
of benefits to all countries and ending the practice of 
applying reduction rates to entitlement transfers to 
certain countries.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social 
protection systems and measures for all, including 
floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of 
the poor and the vulnerable.
1.a: Ensure significant mobilisation of resources 
from a variety of sources, including through 
enhanced development cooperation, in order 
to provide adequate and predictable means for 
developing countries, in particular least developed 
countries, to implement programmes and policies to 
end poverty in all its dimensions.
10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and 
social protection policies, and progressively achieve 
greater equality.
5.4: Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic 
work through the provision of public services, 
infrastructure and social protection policies and 
the promotion of shared responsibility within the 
household and the family as nationally appropriate.
 • Decrease the financial burden of transferring social 
protection benefits to countries of origin. Countries can 
do this by introducing fixed transfer fees for certain 
entitlements to keep these low, requiring transfer 
operators to disclose fees, tax charges and exchange 
rates to increase transparency, and/or ending any 
exclusivity arrangements with banks or agents to 
encourage operator competition (Watkins and Quattri, 
2014).
Conclusion 3: The implementation and enforcement 
of social protection arrangements for migrants can 
be ineffective.
Even with bilateral social protection portability agreements 
in place, many migrants continue to be left without 
effective coverage as the implementation and enforcement 
of these can be inadequate. The administration and 
financing of well-intentioned portability agreements 
can be beyond the capacity of under-funded national 
social protection departments. Further, take-up can be 
low amongst labour migrants due to burdensome and 
confusing documentation requirements, language barriers, 
and financial or time constraints. 
Recommendation: strengthen the capacities of 
national bodies to design and enforce social 
protection arrangements better.
 • Make portability agreements legally binding, ensuring 
regional and bilateral portability efforts are enacted 
at the national level. Increase the enforcement 
capabilities of national social security administrations 
and other relevant bodies to implement and enforce 
these agreements. For example, where possible ensure 
that monitoring mechanisms for social protection 
arrangements include both national agencies and non-
governmental organisations, to give a fuller picture of 
compliance.
 • Introduce compliance procedures for employers and 
appropriate oversight mechanisms. For example, 
governments can introduce mandatory social protection 
provisions in work contracts which set out entitlements 
in detail. They can also improve protection of labour 
migrants against legal reprisals from employers by 
ensuring that effective and timely complaint, appeal 
and redress mechanisms are available to migrant 
workers free of charge. Such mechanisms should also be 
available in languages spoken by migrants and through 
channels accessible to them.
 • Encourage social protection take-up by labour migrants. 
Tools for doing this include information campaigns 
that raise awareness on existing rights and entitlements 
(in different languages), greater efficiency and clarity 
in administrative procedures (including through better 
trained staff), and establishing more flexible rules and 
procedures to incentivise joining (ILO, 2014). Adopt a 
more migrant-centric approach by including migrants 
and migration organisations in the design process (Ratel 
et al., 2013). 
 • There is very little data on coverage of labour migrants, 
which exacerbates the ineffectiveness of social 
protection arrangements in place. This is partly because 
irregular migrants are usually missing from official 
population statistics, but also because even regular 
migrants are not always clearly identified in either data 
or legislation. Countries should work towards collecting 
data to help estimate effective, or de facto, social 
protection coverage of labour migrants. National data 
on social protection programmes should disaggregate 
by citizenship and residence status (a strong proxy 
for migrant status), so as to manage the financial 
implications of benefits becoming portable. 
Relevant SDG Targets
10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and 
social protection policies, and progressively achieve 
greater equality.
10.7: Facilitate orderly, safe and responsible 
migration, implement planned and well-managed 
migration policies.
10.c: Reduce transaction costs of migrant 
remittances. 
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social 
protection systems and measures for all, including 
floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of 
the poor and the vulnerable.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions at all levels. 
17.18: By 2020, enhance capacity-building 
support to developing countries, including for least 
developed countries and small island developing 
States, to increase significantly the availability of 
high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated 
by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory 
status, disability, geographic location and other 
characteristics relevant in national contexts.
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Conclusion 4: Expanding legal social protection 
coverage can be politically and financially 
challenging.
All too often, migrants are perceived as taking advantage 
of national welfare systems (Ford and Heath, 2014), 
which makes the expansion of legal coverage to migrants 
politically challenging. The expansion of a social 
protection system does carry a cost, especially where 
benefits are funded from general taxation, yet labour 
migrants have the potential to be a financial and economic 
asset for host countries. Indeed, host countries often draw 
a positive fiscal balance from labour migration, depending 
on demographic characteristics of migrants and status of 
national labour markets (OECD, 2013).
Recommendation: recognise the economic and fiscal 
contributions of migrants and use these to expand 
social protection eligibility.
 • To fund improved legal social protection coverage, the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN DESA, 2015) proposes 
that governments broaden and diversify the tax base. By 
allowing migrants to work formally and to contribute 
towards national social insurance systems, destination 
countries can grow their tax base and spread risk across 
a larger pool.
 • Strengthen the political will to increase social protection 
eligibility for migrants, particularly in key destination 
countries. Policy-makers should be encouraged to use 
reliable, empirical evidence on the economic and fiscal 
contribution of migrants to host countries (Dustmann 
and Frattini, 2013; OECD, 2013) and the consequences 
of (not) granting migrants access to national social 
protection systems in order to help them make decisions 
in a polarised political context.
 • Make efforts to shift public attitudes towards favouring 
migrant access to national social protection systems, 
by targeting specific groups with information about the 
economic and fiscal benefits of migration (Dempster and 
Hargrave, 2017). 
 • Governments need to cooperate to facilitate payments 
into and out of migrant welfare funds (for example, 
overseas workers funds) based in a migrant’s origin 
country. Facilitation measures could include lowering 
transfer fees on remittances into social protection funds 
and host countries allowing administration offices for 
such funds to operate there.
Relevant SDG Targets
1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social 
protection systems and measures for all, including 
floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of 
the poor and the vulnerable. 
1.a: Ensure significant mobilisation of resources 
from a variety of sources, including through 
enhanced development cooperation, in order 
to provide adequate and predictable means for 
developing countries, in particular least developed 
countries, to implement programmes and policies to 
end poverty in all its dimensions.
10.4: Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and 
social protection policies, and progressively achieve 
greater equality.
16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions at all levels. 
17.18: By 2020, enhance capacity-building 
support to developing countries, including for least 
developed countries and small island developing 
States, to increase significantly the availability of 
high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated 
by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory 
status, disability, geographic location and other 
characteristics relevant in national contexts.
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